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INTRODUCTION
The District Court granted defendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that the
decision not to market the subject property ("Soldier Summit") in any manner despite
repeated acknowledgments that they could and would, but intentionally failed to do so, was
not "willful misconduct" and that plaintiffs did not rely upon such conduct.
Knowing that the record supports willful misconduct and reliance, Defendants also
argue that all of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations which the
District Court did not decide in any manner or way.
Finally, defendants, knowing that plaintiffs' willful misconduct claims have raised
material issues of fact, further argue that they did not have any intent to deceive which issue
was not even briefed or argued in the Court below, much less decided by the Court below.
Prior to February 1982, Po Chang managed Soldier Summit. (R. 898-900, 1359-60,
1453.) In February 1982, due to a bitter deteriorating relationship, the Lins and the Changs
executed an agreement in which the Changs gave up significant assets to the Lins for an
interest in Soldier Summit, a developed project imminently to be subdivided for sale.
(R. 873-877.) In 1982, prior to the separation, everyone agreed that the property was ready
and able to be on the market. (R. 1790-93, 1810, 1821-24, 1802-04, 1825.) After the
separation, the Lins managed Soldier Summit. (R. 1498-99.) They assured the Changs time
and again in the 1982-89 time period that the property would be marketed soon. (R. 1810,
1821-24, 1825, 1802-04.) From 1984 to 1989, plaintiffs continued to request information

and status of Soldier Summit. (R. 1813.) It was not until 1989 that defendants finally
informed plaintiffs of their true intent. Defendants did not intend to market the property and
had not intended to do so since 1982. (R. 1780-81.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' ENTIRE THEORY OF THE CASH WAS A
WILLFUL
FAILURE TO DEVELOP THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
Plaintiffs' entire theory of the case is that the Lins entered into a Separation
Agreement with the plaintiffs, became dissatisfied with it, were dissatisfied that they gave
up a portion of their limited partnership in Soldier Summit and used Soldier Summit as a
vehicle to punish the plaintiffs in this case. The core intent was willful and malicious, as
supported by the pleadings, supported by the allegations, supported by the evidence and
supported by plaintiffs' own theory of the case. There was a fiduciary duty, causation and
damages. For the court to hold as a matter of law that there was no such breach is error.
Even the court admitted that there was misconduct. As stated in the Memorandum
Decision, the court stated:
There is some evidence that defendants refused to provide plaintiffs requested
information regarding the partnership and that defendants may have misled
plaintiffs regarding the development prospects for the property. (R. 1906.)
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Plaintiff Po Chang was in charge of developing Soldier Summit up through the
Separation Agreement in 1982. At that point, there was submitted testimony from both Jay
Murphy and Todd Harris who both said that, with very little effort or expense, the property
could have been on the market in 1982. Jay Murphy, the original project manager for the
development, was very clear that the objective for the partnership was to develop and market,
as quickly as possible, the property. Murphy stated as follows:
I can clearly tell you what the intents were because they weren't an opinion at
all. It was to buy the land, annex it to the city, subdivide it as quickly as
possible and market it. (R. 1774.) . . .
My understanding was that the acquisition of the land was never intended to
sit and wait for years to do something with it. It was to be purchased and
developed immediately. It was a long development plan, but sales were to
occur as fast as possible. That is my total understanding. (R. 1776.)
Both Jay Murphy and Todd Harris, experienced recreational real estate salespersons,
stated in the record that the marketing plan was to have at least two plats of the development
on the market in 1982. Then, when the Lins took over the management of the partnership,
the development came to an inexplicable halt. No plausible explanations were ever given
by the Lins, and as a result, the partnership missed a great opportunity to market the property
in the 1982-1984 time frame and continues even today.
The Todd Harris Affidavit states as follows:
3.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, I [was] involved in various respects
with the development known as Soldier Summit Development, including
attending meetings with the City Council.
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4.
At that time, the objective of the developers of the property was to
develop and get portions of that property on the market as soon as possible.
I assisted, in various ways, to accomplish this objective. With relatively little
effort or expense, the property could have been on the market in 1982.

8.
I am aware that in early 1982, a dispute between the Lins and the
Changs arose which led them to a separation of many of the business dealings
between them. At that time, the Lins, or their representatives, took over the
management of the Soldier Summit Development from the Changs and their
representatives. At that time, all work on the project came to an abrupt halt.
We could not get any information or assistance from the Lins in order to
complete the development and put the lots on the market in 1982.
9.
In that same approximate time frame, Henry Yen, a representative of
the Lins and/or their entities, informed me that the Lins had determined not to
market the property, but they had simply decided to delay the development.
He had no explanation for this decision by the Lins. It appeared to me they
were stalling the development.
10.
Based upon my experience in selling mountain real estate lots at that
time, it is my opinion that due to the Lins' inaction in developing and
marketing the property in 1982 through 1984, the partnership missed a great
business opportunity to turn Soldier Summit Development into a viable and
profitable project. Since 1978 through the present I have been selling
mountain real estate lots that are very comparable to the original development
plan that we were working on in Soldier Summit. (R. 1786-88.)
After Po Chang was no longer in management, and after the separation, and after the
project came to a screeching halt, the Changs wrote letters to the Lins asking for information
about the status and progress of the development. On October 26, 1984, Beatrice Chang
wrote a letter to Henry Yen, who became President of Soldier Summit, as follows:
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We have repeatedly asked for a meeting on keeping us informed about the
status and progress of the development of the Soldier Summit Project. We
need to be assured that all the progress and achievements which we obtained
before your assumption of management were not jeopardized because of your
mismanagement. So far, we have not heard one word about a definite plan for
a meeting.
We demand once more on having a meeting to keep us informed on all the
status and activities regarding Soldier Summit. (R. 1813.)
In response, Henry Yen, President of Soldier Summit, answered the letter of Beatrice
Chang as follows:
As you know, Phase I and II of the Soldier Summit project are ready to be
placed on the market. Therefore; we feel it necessary to have a partnership
meeting to inform all partners of the progress we have made and to collect
ideas on how to successfully market the property. (R. 1812.)
As noted in the Memorandum Decision of the court below, the record is replete with
the fact that the defendants misled the plaintiffs relating to the development of the
partnership and withheld information about the status of the property. (R. 1906.)
At the partnership meeting in December 1984, it was represented to the partners that
current plans called for water to be used to develop 500 recreational lots, 80 high density lots
and one motel. (R. 1825.)
In 1997, Clark Lin, the Chief Executive Officer of all the Lin companies, finally
admitted that in 1986 the Lins were using their dispute with the Changs as an excuse not to
develop the property. Mr. Lin testified as follows:
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Q.

So Paragraph C, to summarize then, the reason that the developer had
not completed the installation and construction of the improvements
was in essence the disputes that the Lins were having with the Changs
and the Lin companies.

A.

That's not the only reason. I guess it doesn't say that's the only reason.
But that's one of the reasons in their mind, too. (R. 1830.)

Defendants argue, commencing in their brief at 15, what willful misconduct means
and how cases have construed willful misconduct as opposed to gross negligence, negligence
or business judgment. That portion of the argument is superfluous. Plaintiffs' entire theory
of the case is based upon willful misconduct and fraud in failure to develop the property.
Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that the Lins entered into the Separation Agreement, became
dissatisfied with it, and Defendants' core intent was willful and malicious. Defendants
define willful misconduct as the intentional failure to do an act with knowledge that serious
injury is the probable result. Defendants' actions as against the plaintiffs and willful failure
to develop in this instance was the intentional failure to do an act with knowledge that serious
injury would result and that defendants intended to cause the harm.
Curiously, the defendants try to reframe the issue before the Court. The defendants
state in their brief at page 10 that the issue in the court below was not whether the general
partner willfully failed to develop the property, but whether non-sale of the property is
"willful misconduct." That is not plaintiffs' theory of the case, and it was not the issue
decided by the court below. As stated in the court below, the issue decided by the court was
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whether "failing to develop the property" constituted willful misconduct is supported by the
pleadings and the record. (R. 1904.) It is not the non-sale of the property that is at issue.
The issue is the failure to develop the property so that it could be sold.
Defendants attempt to support their claim of no willful misconduct by merely
contradicting the record in the case. The defendants state as follows:
They [defendants] could not sell the lots during that time because they were
not ready, and even if they had marketed the lots during that time, they would
have lost money, as subsequent studies show. (Appellees' Brief at 18).
There is no reference to the record for that statement and it borders on recklessness.
Po Chang said that the lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1790-1801.) Todd Harris said that the
lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1785-88.) Jay Murphy, the original project manager, said that
the lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1769-77.) Henry Yen, the Lins' representative and
President of Soldier Summit after the separation, said that the lots were ready to be sold.
(R. 1810-12.) Clark Lin said that the lots were ready to be sold. (R. 1821-25.)
It was not until October 29, 1989 that defendants stated that the business and
marketing outlook for Soldier Summit was bleak and that the property would not be
marketed any time soon using as two excuses: a theft of aspen trees and prior expenditures.
(R. 1826-27.)
In their brief, at page 18, defendants refer to a January 1986 Kasper Report that the
proposed development would result in economic loss and, therefore, the property could not
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be developed. Interestingly, Sandra Lin never used the Kasper Report as an excuse not be
market the property in her October 29,1989 letter to the Changs. (R. 1826-27.)
Second, the Kasper Report was never provided to the Changs until after this litigation
commenced even though the Kasper Report is dated three years earlier.
Third, in 1985, Clark Lin, a consultant for IID and, later in 1987, Chief Executive
Officer of Soldier Summit, prepared a business plan for the development wherein he
projected sales in 1985, 1986 and 1987 with revenues of at least $2 million dollars and
projected a $30 to $300 million dollar company by 1995. Lin's report states:
Soldier Summer Development has both long term and short term objectives.
The short term objective is to recover the investment and become a selfsustained economic entity by the end of 1987. The long term goal of the
development is to achieve a $30-to-$300 million dollar company by 1995.
The short term development goal can be sequentially accomplished in three
phases: (1) Phase 1 (1985): Develop Plat C and sell 15 lots. Complete Master
Plan. (2) Phase 2 (1986): Sell 15 lots. Get approval of Master Plan. (3)
Phase 3 (1987): Sell 15 lots. (R. 1822.)
Lin's report is contrary to the Kasper Report.
Fourth, prior to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Kasper Report was never even
subject to discovery and Kasper was never deposed. Discovery of expert witness testimony
was to continue after the Motion for Summary Judgment on factual disputes was argued.
(R. 1565.)
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Finally, and more interestingly, the Kasper Report does not even say it was
economically unfeasible. The Kasper Report assumes the success of the project. In fact, the
Kasper Report is more "bullish" about the sale of lots than even Lin's report. Clark Lin, to
obtain $30 to 300 million dollars by 1995, assumed only 15 lots per year sold. The Kasper
Report assumes 20 to 30 lots per year sold. (R. 1521.)
Defendants also mention a report from Robert Wietzke to show that it was not
economically feasible to market Soldier Summit (Appellees' Brief at 8).
First, the Wietzke report was not prepared until January 24, 1996. (R. 1557).
Wietzke, an expert, was never deposed prior to argument on the Motion for Summary
Judgment. Expert witnesses, although scheduled, had not been commenced or completed in
accordance with the Court's Scheduling Order. (R. 1565.)
Second, the cost assumptions used by Wietzke were based on a report by a company
called Tuttle Engineering, a report never produced to plaintiffs through discovery and never
seen by plaintiffs although requested. (R. 1552-53.)
Third, these estimates and descriptions are flatly contradicted by the City of Soldier
Summit's own requirements as to what was needed for completion of the project. The
schedule of on-site improvements remaining were further road work, a water pickup station,
culverts, and an entrance road. (R. 1836-37.) Tuttle Engineering assumed the installation of
a sewer system, an underground electric power system, and a complete water system, not
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even required by the City and never envisioned to be built by anyone prior to the filing of this
action. (R. 1552-53.) Wietzke's report not only raises material issues of fact, but it is
ludicrous on its face.
Defendants also assert that in April 1984, the state of Utah dissolved the town of
Soldier Summit and was thereafter subject to the jurisdiction of Utah County which imposed
substantially more strict and difficult conditions for subdivision approval. (Appellee's Brief
at 6). That statement is not only contradicted, but false.
While Soldier Summit was dissolved, the Special Service District continued in
existence and the District was bound, which it never denied, by its Agreement with Soldier
Summit to permit the development to go forward. (R. 1832-1833.)
Defendants finally assert that the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rejected
the project's registration. That statement is also false (Appellees' Brief at 6). According to
Jay Murphy, the only thing needed to finalize the HUD registration was "just some additional
legal work." (R. 1771).
Defendants' cases are inapposite. Defendants cite Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d
577 (Utah App. 1998). The only issue in Reedeker was that the plaintiff in Reedeker argued
that the trial court erred in ruling that his failure to allege intentional misconduct did not
defeat his tort claims for negligence, gross negligence and breach of duty of care against a
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non-profit corporation. In this case, plaintiffs have not only alleged, but plaintiffs' theory
of the case is, intentional willful misconduct and fraud unlike Reedeker.
Defendants also cite C & Y Corp. v. General & Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah
App. 1995). In C & Y. former directors of a corporation brought suit against a corporation
claiming breach of contract. After a non-jury trial, the trial court found that the directors had
not breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation. C & Y has no applicability to this case.
Defendants also cite Cincinnati Bell Cellular Systems Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Phone
Systems. 1996 W.L. 506906 (Del. Ch. 1996), affd. 692 A.2d 411 (Del. 1997), which merely
held that the general partner would not be liable for any loss to the partnership by reason of
any act or failure to act unless the general partner was guilty of willful misconduct or gross
negligence. In this case, as argued above, there is ample evidence of willful misconduct and
even admissions of willful misconduct by defendants5 Chief Executive Officer. The Court
below even found evidence of misleading and intentional withholding of information by the
defendants.
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POINT II
THE EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION DOES STATE CLAIMS FOR
RELIEF AND ARE SUPPORTED BY THE ALLEGATIONS.
PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE AND THE RECORD.
CREATING GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
THUS PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The sole issue the court must decide as to this point is whether the Motion for
Summary Judgment was properly granted as to the fraud and misrepresentations claims
contained in the Eighth Claim for Relief. Defendants assert that the Eighth Claim should
have been properly dismissed because there was no intent to deceive and no detrimental
reliance.
A.

Intent to Deceive is Clearly Manifested.

First, the issue of intent to deceive was not even briefed or raised in the court below,
much less decided by the court below. In most situations, intent is a question of fact for the
trier of fact because the intent may be inferred. In this case, intent to deceive need not even
be inferred. The intent to deceive is patently manifest. See Galloway v. AFCO Development
Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989). As stated in Galloway, the court stated with respect
to the element of intent as follows:
The intent to deceive, required for common law fraud, may be inferred where
a misrepresentation is voluntarily communicated to the victim with knowledge
that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false, but knowing that
the victim is likely to rely on it.
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Thus, as noted in Pace v. Parrish. it is sometimes said that a 'reckless'
misrepresentation made 'knowing that [the misrepresenter] had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such a representation' is tantamount to the intent to
deceive.
777 P.2d at 509.
Further, intent need not be shown where the victim stands in a confidential or
fiduciary relationship with the misrepresenter.

It is a fundamental characteristic of

partnership that the partners' relationship with one another is one of trust and confidence
when dealing with each other in partnership matters.
In all matters connected with the partnership, the general partner is bound to act in a
manner not to obtain any advantage over his co-partner in the partnership affairs by the
slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind. Leff v.
Gunter, 189 Cal. Rptr. 377, 658 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1984). Intent need not be shown where the
victim, the Changs, stands in a confidential relationship with the misrepresenter.
The Lins cite Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mevers. 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994)
and Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982). Those cases
are clearly inapposite. Neither case involves a fiduciary relationship as in this case. In
Andalex. the only evidence that the counterclaim plaintiff asserted against the alleged
defrauder was basically no evidence. The counterclaim plaintiffs evidence consisted of a
denial by the counterclaim defendant that it had ever made the promise claimed to be
fraudulent.
-13-

In this case, you have the following: (1) in 1984, defendants represented to plaintiffs
and Jay Murphy, previously the project manager of Soldier Summit, in writing that the
Soldier Summit property would soon be on the market (R. 1810-12, 1802); (2) from 1984 to
1989, plaintiffs repeatedly requested information, including financial and status reports,
about Soldier Summit but did not receive the information requested (R. 1813, 1802-07);
(3) in 1985, Clark Lin, then a consultant to IID, prepared a business plan for Soldier Summit
wherein he projected sales in 1985, 1986 and 1987 with revenues of at least $2 million
dollars and projected a $30 to $300 million dollar company by 1995 (R. 1821-24);
(4) throughout the 1980s, the Lins made representations to the Changs that Soldier Summit
would be marketed soon (R. 1813, 1802-07); (5) at the partnership meeting in December
1984, it was represented to the partners that current plans called for water to be used to
develop 500 recreational lots, 80 high density lots, and one motel (R. 1825); (6) in 1997,
Clark Lin, the chief executive officer of all the Lin companies, finally admitted that in 1986,
the Lins were using their dispute with the Changs as an excuse not to develop the property
(R. 1830); and (7) it was not until 1989, for the first time, despite repeated assurances, that
the Lins informed the Changs that the property would not be marketed. (R. 1802-07,
1826-27.)
Similarly, Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. L 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982) is
also not helpful to the defendants. First, Cerritos was appellate review of a directed verdict
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after both parties had presented their evidence. Second, the counterplaintiffs in Cerritos were
urging the Utah Supreme Court to find that a representation would be actionable in fraud
because, although it may have been the alleged defrauder's intention to perform pursuant to
the representation made, they were negligent in formulating that intention. The Court in
Cerritos was correctly unwilling to find that to be fraud. The Court in Cerritos. however,
recognized the long-standing rule in this jurisdiction as follows:
The jurisprudence of this state has long recognized as actionable deceit a
promise accompanied by the present intention not to perform it, made for the
purpose of deceiving the promisee, thereby inducing him to act where
otherwise he would not have done so, and by virtue of which he parts with his
money or property.
645P.2dat611.
As to the facts of this case, defendants assert that there was no present intention to
deceive because (1) plaintiffs balked at paying certain contributions and (2) development
of a marketing plan, the Kasper market study in 1986, showed that the recreational lots
would not be profitable. (Appellees' Brief at 24-25.) That statement is inherently incredible.
The contributions plaintiffs balked at paying was a contribution that the court below found
that plaintiffs did not owe, namely, the mortgage on the partnership's property. According
to the partnership agreements, the mortgage was an expense liability and debt not owed by
plaintiffs. The court below stated:
According to Paragraph 5, and ' [notwithstanding any other provision of the
Partnership Agreement, all pre-March 1982 debts or obligations of the
-15-

partnership are deemed personal obligations of the General Partner. There is
no suggestion that the General Partner be credited for these payments as cash
contributions to the partnership. . . . Plaintiffs gave up their substantial
interests in other assets in order to receive a partnership free of all debts. It
would be contrary to the intent of the parties to explicitly preclude the
mortgage payments as debts of the Limited Partner, while allowing those
payments as contributions of the General Partner. (R. 1903.)
Defendants knew that plaintiffs believed that they were not liable for such
contributions. See Letter dated October 26,1984 to Henry Yen from Beatrice Chang stating:
We have clearly stated our position with reference to Soldier Summit
Development Company's payments in the past years. We hereby request that
you stop all harassment for any expenses which are not our responsibility."
(R. 1813.)
The books and records of the partnership (first partially obtained by plaintiffs in 1989)
clearly show that defendants were in fact paying the mortgage, a debt they had contractually
assumed, while crediting their capital account thus essentially wiping out any equity the
plaintiffs had in the property. (R. 1818.) Not only did the books and records show no equity
of plaintiffs, the books falsely showed that money was owed by the plaintiffs to the
partnership.
Moreover, the assertion that the Kasper market study states that the property as
recreational lots would not be profitable is simply not true. The Kasper Report in no way
indicates that the marketing of the property would be unprofitable. (R. 1519-51.)
Todd Harris testified that "the partnership missed a great business opportunity to turn
Soldier Summit Development into a viable and profitable project." (R. 1787.)
-16-

Finally, the fact that defendants continued to assure plaintiffs that the property would
be on the market soon in 1984 and 1985 and then not inform the plaintiffs in 1989 that it
would probably not be marketed at all does clearly infer that the defendants, through
Mr. Yen, were lying.
B.

No Detrimental Reliance Need be Shown Because of the Confidential
Relationship and Detrimental Reliance Did. In Fact. Occur.

The court below held that, even assuming misrepresentation and fraud by the fiduciary
defendants, plaintiffs, as a matter of law, sustained no injury whatsoever in reliance upon
defendants' alleged misrepresentations regarding either development prospects for the
partnership property or financial information supplied by defendants.
As this court has noted, reasonable reliance must be considered with references to the
facts of each case, and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Berkeley Bank for
Coops v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980).
Defendants are fiduciaries in all matters connected with the partnership. The general
partner is bound to act in a manner not to obtain any advantage over his co-partner in the
partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure
of any kind.
Plaintiffs had no managerial control pursuant to limited partnership law whatsoever
except recourse to legal process.
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They were required, as a matter of law, to rely upon defendants to act in the utmost
good faith because they could not, by law, assist in management of the partnership for
partnership purposes. The law absolutely presumes that there is detrimental reliance as a
matter of law. The Court in Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), cited
approvingly of the following language:
A course of dealing between persons so situated is watched with extreme
jealousy and solicitude, and if there is found the slightest trace of undue
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured party.
(Citation omitted.)
590 P.2d at 302.
Further, there is detrimental reliance in fact. The court below found that there was
evidence that defendants refused to provide plaintiffs requested information regarding the
partnership and that defendants had mislead plaintiffs regarding the development prospects
for the property. (R. 1904.) Defendants lied to the plaintiffs regarding Soldier Summit. On
January 5, 1984, Mr. Yen indicated that the Soldier Summit Development was nearing
completion and that they would have the lots on the market by spring.

(R. 1810.)

Defendants lied about Soldier Summit when they stated that they were confident that 1984
would be a good year for Soldier Summit. (R. 1810.) Defendants lied about defendants'
actual intentions in marketing the property when they stated that the Soldier Summit property
was "very close to being placed on the market." (R. 1811.) Defendants lied about the
financial condition of the partnership when they were requesting contributions that were not
-18-

otherwise required. (R. 1813.) Defendants lied as to when they were going to market the
property when they said that the Soldier Summit project was ready to be placed on the
market. (R. 1812, 1789-1807.) Defendants lied that the short term development goal was
to sell 15 lots during the years 1985, 1986 and 1987. (R. 1821-24.) Defendants lied about
the project when defendants stated that the short term objective was to recover the investment
and become a self sustained economic entity by the end of 1987 and that the long term goal
of the development was to achieve a $300 million dollar company by 1995. (R. 1821-24.)
Defendants lied in the partnership meeting dated December 27, 1984 when they stated that
current plans called for development of 500 recreational lots, 80 high density lots and one
motel in the financial books of the partnership. (R. 1825.) Defendants lied by asserting that
plaintiffs owed money for a debt that plaintiffs did not owe. (R. 1813.) Defendants
alternatively concealed that lie by not providing the financial information after repeated
requests. (R. 1813-19.)
In the 1984-1985 time period, when defendants were lying to plaintiffs about the
property and, alternatively, concealing information, plaintiffs forbore any action. They could
have dissolved the partnership in 1984. They could have filed a lawsuit in 1984. They could
have sought legal redress in 1984. They could have sued for rescission of the 1982
separation agreement in 1984. Plaintiffs gave up significant assets to obtain their percentage
share in Soldier Summit. They could have dissolved the separation agreement to reacquire
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the assets given up in acquiring their percentage interest in Soldier Summit. Plaintiffs did
not do these things because of defendants'fraud.

POINT III
DEFENDANTS CANNOT NOW ARGUE THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
Defendants in the court below argued that plaintiffs' Second, Seventh and Eighth
Claim were barred by statute of limitations; however, the district court did not decide these
limitations issues.
Defendants cannot now argue that limitations apply. Defendants' own brief states as
follows in their arguments relating to detrimental reliance:
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of loss, and no such loss can possibly be
determined until the property is actually sold. Because plaintiffs have incurred
no definable loss, their claims are not ripe for adjudication.
See Appellees' Brief at 11.
According to defendants' own summary of argument, defendants argue not only has
the statute of limitations not run, plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for adjudication even today.
Plaintiffs' Complaint, alleging a failure to develop the property under the second
claim for relief- breach of fiduciary duty, the seventh claim for relief- breach of contract,
and the eighth claim for relief- fraud and deceit, was first filed in March of 1990. It is true
that plaintiffs knew that the property was not on the market from 1982 through the date the
-20-

Complaint was filed. However, during that time, the defendants were either concealing
information from the Changs as to the status of the development and their plans for the
property or simply misrepresenting the status of the project and their intentions regarding it.
Defendants repeatedly stated that the property would soon be on the market, and provided
plaintiffs with otherwise misleading information.

Despite numerous requests for

information, it was not until October of 1989 that the Changs were informed as to the Lins'
position and philosophy regarding Soldier Summit when the Lins announced that the project
would not be developed.
Utah law does not permit a party to lull a potential adversary into a false sense of
security and thereby subject the adversary's claim to the bar of a statute of limitations
defense:
Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable
adjustment of this claim will be made may create an estoppel against pleading
the statute of limitations.
Rice v. Granite School Dist. 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969), (quoting North v. Culmer,
193 So. 2d 701, 705 (Fla. App. 1963)). This is exactly what defendants have done in this
case.
Plaintiffs' claims are tolled until discovery by the aggrieved party of "facts
constituting fraud or breach due to the misleading actions of defendants." Plaintiffs did not
learn of the fraud or the fact that defendants were not abiding by the Separation Agreement
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or the amendment until 1989 at the earliest. Therefore, the tort, fraud and contract claims did
not accrue until that date.
Here, the defendants lulled plaintiffs into believing that the property would be
developed as planned. Based upon those representations, plaintiffs did not act to protect their
interests until 1990.
In Butcher v. Gilroy. 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987), the Butchers and Gilroy
stipulated to the entry of a written settlement agreement to resolve disputes among them.
The agreement vested in Gilroy title in certain land, and required Gilroy to sell the land by
April, 1976 and split the proceeds of that sale with the Butchers.
Both parties attempted to sell the land, but were delayed by various subdivision
development changes and watershed questions. Finally, in 1982, Gilroy sold the property,
but he did not inform the Butchers of the sale and did not account for them for their share of
the proceeds. Rather, he continued to encourage the Butchers in their attempt to secure a
buyer and informed them that he was also continuing his efforts to sell the property.
In 1984, the Butchers learned of the 1982 sale and brought an action against Gilroy
seeking an accounting in their share of the proceeds. Gilroy moved to dismiss the Complaint
arguing that the Butchers' claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23, the six year
statute of limitations applicable to written instruments. The trial court granted the Motion
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reasoning that the cause of action accrued in 1976 when Gilroy failed to sell the property as
required by the parties' settlement agreement. 744 P.2d at 312.
This Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that there are important exceptions to
the general rule that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary
to complete the cause of action:
[I]n some circumstances, where the statute of limitations would normally bar
a claim, proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant precludes the
defendant by raising the statute of limitations defense.
744P.2dat314.
The opinion in Butcher is controlling here. Due to their own misleading actions, due
to their own misleading statements, due to their own acts giving plaintiffs a false sense of
security, defendants are estopped from asserting the statutes of limitation defenses.
Also, as stated in Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1377 (Utah App. 1993) (Orme, J.,
concurring in the result):
Generally, "a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action." (Citation omitted.)
In a typical case, the application of this rule is reasonably straightforward
because a single event occurs, such as a punch in the nose, a trespass upon
one's property, which completes a cause of action. Courts, however, have
adapted to rarer instances where a defendant's wrongful actions occur over a
period of time. In such cases 'where a continuous chain of events or course of
conduct is involved, the cause of action accrues at the time of the final act in
that series of events or course of conduct.' (Citation omitted.)
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The focus of an inquiry into whether plaintiffs' allegations are covered by the
continuing wrong theory is on the defendants' wrongful activities.
Defendants contend that the plaintiffs' fiduciary duty and contract claims are barred
somehow in 1984 because defendants wrongfully failed to market the Soldier Summit
property in 1982 through 1984. The defendants still wrongfully failed and still had a
contractual duty to develop and market that property from 1985 forward. The defendants
concealed their fraud by lulling the plaintiffs into a false sense of security, and lied to the
plaintiffs until 1989 when defendants announced that they had done nothing concerning the
property and intended to do nothing. Even to this day, the defendants continue to breach
their duties to plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order of Summary Judgment
and the case remanded for trial under the second, seventh and eighth claims for relief.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 1998.
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